We investigate properties of ABA + , a formalism that extends the well studied structured argumentation formalism Assumption-Based Argumentation (ABA) with a preference handling mechanism. In particular, we establish desirable properties that ABA + semantics exhibit. These pave way to the satisfaction by ABA + of some (arguably) desirable principles of preference handling in argumentation and nonmonotonic reasoning, as well as non-monotonic inference properties of ABA + under various semantics.
Introduction
properties for argumentation with preferences indicated (e.g. (Brewka, Truszczyński, and Woltran 2010; Modgil and Prakken 2013; Amgoud and Vesic 2014; Dung 2016) ).
NMR properties are also adaptable to argumentation setting. For example, the well known nonmonotonic inference properties of Cautious Monotonicity and Cumulative Transitivity (cf. (Makinson 1988; Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor 1990) ) concern what happens when a conclusion reached through a reasoning process is added to the knowledge base to reason with anew. These properties have been cast with respect to extensions in argumentation, in e.g. (Čyras and Toni 2015; Dung 2016) .
Preference handling properties for NMR can be phrased in terms of extensions in argumentation too. For instance, the well known Principle I from (Brewka and Eiter 1999) regarding preferred answer sets can be applied to argumentation semantics thus: if two extensions E 1 and E 2 coincide except for two arguments A ∈ E 1 \ E 2 and B ∈ E 2 \ E 1 such that A is preferred over B, then E 2 should not be chosen as a 'preferable' extension. Likewise, a common property of NMR says that, in the absence of preference information, a formalism extended with a preference handling mechanism should return the same extensions as the preference-free version of the formalism (see e.g. (Brewka, Truszczyński, and Woltran 2010; Simko 2014) ).
In this paper, drawing from the above mentioned works, we investigate various properties of a recently proposed NMR formalism ABA + (Čyras and Toni 2016a) . ABA + extends with a preference handling mechanism a well established argumentation formalism, AssumptionBased Argumentation (ABA) (Bondarenko et al. 1997; . Whereas a common way to approach preferences in argumentation is to use preference information to discard the attacks from arguments that are less preferred than the ones they attack (see e.g. (Amgoud and Cayrol 2002; Bench-Capon 2003; Kaci and van der Torre 2008; Brewka et al. 2013; ), ABA + instead reverses such attacks. We show that ABA + 's method of accounting for preferences satisfies (arguably) desirable properties.
On the one hand, we consider preference handling properties from (Brewka and Eiter 1999; Brewka, Truszczyński, and Woltran 2010; Amgoud and Vesic 2014) and show their satisfaction under various ABA + semantics. On the other hand, building on the investigations of Cumulative Transitivity and Cautious Monotonicity for ABA (Čyras and Toni 2015) , we analyse ABA + in the light of these non-monotonic inference properties. In addition, we make use of the well known principle of Contraposition of rules (see e.g. (Modgil and Prakken 2013) ) and prove it guarantees that ABA + semantics satisfy desirable properties akin to those in e.g. (Dung 1995; Bondarenko et al. 1997; Modgil and Prakken 2013) .
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 give preliminaries on ABA and ABA + . In Section 4 ABA + semantics are analysed. Preference handling properties of ABA + are studied in Section 5, while Section 6 concerns ABA + and non-monotonic inference properties. After discussing related work (Section 7), we conclude in Section 8.
Preliminaries
We base the following ABA background on . Definition 1. An ABA framework is a tuple (L, R, A,¯¯), where:
• (L, R) is a deductive system with a language L and a set R of rules of the form ϕ 0 ← ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ m with m 0 and ϕ i ∈ L for i ∈ {0, . . . , m}; ϕ 0 is referred to as the head of the rule, and ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ m is referred to as the body of the rule; if m = 0, then the rule ϕ 0 ← ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ m is written as ϕ 0 ← ⊤ and is said to have an empty body; • A ⊆ L is a non-empty set, whose elements are referred to as assumptions; •¯¯: A → L is a total map: for α ∈ A, the L-formula α is referred to as the contrary of α. We focus on flat ABA frameworks, where no assumption is the head of any rule. Flat ABA frameworks are very common, and capture, as instances, widely used paradigms of non-monotonic reasoning, such as Logic Programming and Default Logic (see e.g. (Bondarenko et al. 1997) ). Definition 2. A deduction for ϕ ∈ L supported by S ⊆ L and R ⊆ R, denoted by S ⊢ R ϕ, is a finite tree with the root labelled by ϕ, leaves labelled by ⊤ or elements from S, the children of non-leaf nodes ψ labelled by the elements of the body of some rule from R with head ψ, and R being the set of all such rules. For E ⊆ L, the conclusions Cn(E) of E is the set of elements with deductions supported by S ⊆ E and some R ⊆ R, i.e.
Assumption-level attacks in ABA are defined thus. Definition 3. A set A ⊆ A attacks a set B ⊆ A, denoted A B, if there is a deduction A ′ ⊢ R β, for some β ∈ B, supported by some A ′ ⊆ A and R ⊆ R. For E ⊆ A, also called an extension, we say that:
{α} it holds that E B; • E is admissible if E is conflict-free and defends all α ∈ E.
The most standard ABA semantics are as follows.
Definition 4. A conflict-free set E ⊆ A is:
• stable, if E {β} for every {β} ⊆ A \ E; • complete if E is admissible and contains every assumption it defends; • preferred if E is ⊆-maximally admissible;
• grounded if E is ⊆-minimally complete;
• ideal if E is ⊆-maximal such that E is admissible and contained in all preferred extensions.
Example 5. Let L = {α, β, α, β}, R = {α ← β} and A = {α, β}. In (L, R, A,¯¯), {β} attacks both {α} and {α, β}, while {α, β} attacks itself and {α}. (L, R, A,¯¯) can be graphically represented via its assumption framework, pictured below (in illustrations of assumption frameworks, nodes hold sets of assumptions while directed edges indicate attacks):
This (L, R, A,¯¯) has a unique complete extension {β}, which is also grounded, ideal, preferred and stable, and has conclusions Cn({β}) = {α, β}.
ABA
+ ABA + (Čyras and Toni 2016a) extends ABA with preferences as follows. Definition 6. An ABA + framework is any tuple (L, R, A,¯¯, ), where (L, R, A,¯¯) is an ABA framework and is a preorder (i.e. a transitive and reflexive binary relation) on A.
Differently from e.g. (Modgil and Prakken 2013; , ABA + considers preferences on assumptions rather than (defeasible) rules. This is not, however, a conceptual difference, since assumptions are the only defeasible component in ABA + . Unless stated differently, we consider a fixed, but otherwise arbitrary ABA + framework (L, R, A,¯¯, ), and implicitly assume (L, R, A,¯¯) to be its underlying ABA framework. The strict counterpart < of is defined as α < β iff α β and β α, for any α and β.
ABA + attack relation is given thus.
Definition 7.
A set A ⊆ A of assumptions <-attacks a set B ⊆ A of assumptions, written as A < B, if:
• either there is a deduction A ′ ⊢ R β, for some β ∈ B, supported by A ′ ⊆ A, and ∄α ′ ∈ A ′ with α ′ < β; • or there is a deduction B ′ ⊢ R α, for some α ∈ A, supported by B ′ ⊆ B, and ∃β ′ ∈ B ′ with β ′ < α. The first type of attack is called normal, and the second one reverse.
ABA + requires a standard ABA attack to be reversed whenever the attacker has an assumption less preferred than the one attacked. The following example illustrates. Example 8. Recall (L, R, A,¯¯) from Example 5. Suppose β < α. In the ABA + framework (L, R, A,¯¯, ), {β} 'tries' to attack {α}, but is prevented by the preference β < α. Instead, {α} <-attacks {β}, and likewise {α, β}, via reverse attack, and the latter <-attacks both itself and {β} via reverse attack. (L, R, A,¯¯, ) can be represented graphically as follows (reverse attacks in assumption frameworks will be denoted by dotted arrows):
In contrast with the ABA framework, where {β} is unattacked and generates an attack on {α}, in the ABA + framework, {α} is <-unattacked and <-attacks all sets of assumptions that contain β. This concords with the intended meaning of the preference β < α, that the conflict should be resolved in favour of α.
This concept of <-attack reflects the interplay between deductions, contraries and preferences, by representing inherent conflicts among sets of assumptions while accounting for preference information. Normal attacks follow the standard notion of attack in ABA, additionally, preventing the attack to succeed when the attacker uses assumptions less preferred than the one attacked. Reverse attacks, meanwhile, resolve the conflict between two sets of assumptions by favouring the one containing an assumption whose contrary is deduced, over the one which uses less preferred assumptions to deduce that contrary.
The notions of conflict-freeness and defence w.r.t. < , and ABA + semantics are given as follows.
Definition 9. For E ⊆ A we say that:
< A it holds that E < B; and • E is <-admissible if E is <-conflict-free and <-defends E.
In Example 8, ∅, {α} and {β} are conflict-free in (L, R, A,¯¯) and <-conflict-free in (L, R, A,¯¯, ), whereas {α, β} is not (<-)conflict-free in either framework. Definition 10. A <-conflict-free extension E ⊆ A is:
• <-stable if E < {α} for every {α} ⊆ A \ E; • <-complete if E is <-admissible and contains every assumption it <-defends;
and contained in all <-preferred extensions. In Example 8, {α} is a unique <-stable, <-complete, <-preferred, <-grounded and <-ideal extension.
Henceforth, we assume σ ∈ {stable, complete, preferred, grounded, ideal} and use <-σ to denote any ABA + semantics.
We recall several features that ABA + possesses and that will be used later.
Lemma 2. For any A, B ⊆ A: Axiom 11. (L, R, A,¯¯, ) satisfies the Axiom of Contraposition if for all A ⊆ A, R ⊆ R and β ∈ A it holds that if A ⊢ R β, then for every α ∈ A, there is R α ⊆ R with (A \ {α}) ∪ {β} ⊢ Rα α.
This axiom requires that if an assumption plays a role in deriving the contrary of another assumption, then it should contrapositively be possible for the latter to induce a derivation of the contrary of the former assumption too. The following example illustrates the effect Contraposition has in ABA + .
Example 12. Let R = {β ← α, γ}, A = {α, β, γ} and α < β, α < γ. (The language and the contrary mapping are implicit from R and A.) This ABA + framework (L, R, A,¯¯, ) does not satisfy the Axiom of Contraposition. Its assumption framework (omitting ∅, A and <-attacks to and from A) is shown below:
There are no extensions under, for instance, <-complete semantics, because all the singletons {α}, {β} and {γ} are <-unattacked, but {α, β, γ} is not <-conflict-free.
If the rules α ← β, γ and γ ← α, β are added to R to constitute R ′ , then the resulting (L, R ′ , A,¯¯, ) satisfies the Axiom of Contraposition and its assumption framework looks as follows (<-attacks that are both normal and reverse are depicted as solid directed edges):
Here, {β, γ} is a unique <-complete extension.
We prove next that in the presence of Contraposition, the Fundamental Lemma is guaranteed to hold in ABA + .
Lemma 3. Suppose that (L, R, A,¯¯, ) satisfies the Axiom of Contraposition. Let S ⊆ A be <-admissible and assume that S <-defends α, α ′ ∈ A. Then S ∪ {α} is <-admissible and <-defends α ′ .
Proof. Note that if α ∈ S, then S ∪ {α} is trivially <-admissible. So assume α ∈ S and suppose for a contradiction that S ∪ {α} is not <-admissible. Then it is either not <-conflict-free, or does not <-defend itself. Suppose first S ∪ {α} < S ∪ {α} via either (1) normal or (2) reverse attack. We show that either leads to a contradiction. 1. S ∪ {α} < S ∪ {α} via normal attack. As S is <-conflict-free and <-defends α, this <-attack must involve α. I.e. S ′ ∪ {α} ⊢ R β for some S ′ ⊆ S and β ∈ S ∪ {α}, and ∀s ′ ∈ S ′ ∪ {α} we find s ′ < β. If β = α, then S ′ ∪ {α} < {α}, and so S < S ′ ∪ {α}. Else, if β ∈ S ′ , then S ′ ∪ {α} < S, and so S < S ′ ∪ {α} as well. We show that we can similarly obtain S < S ′ ∪ {α} in case (2) too. 2. S∪{α} < S∪{α} via reverse attack. As in 1., this <-attack must involve α, i.e. S ′ ∪ {α} ⊢ R β for some S ′ ⊆ S and β ∈ S ∪ {α}, and ∃s
, and using the Axiom of Contraposition we
′ ∪ {α}, which yields S < S ′ ∪ {α} in any case. In either (1) or (2), S < S ′ ∪ {α}, and as S is <-conflict-free and <-defends α, this <-attack must be reverse and involve α: 
and ∃s
We again impose -minimality on s ′ 2 and by the Axiom of Contrapo-
As deductions are finite and < asymmetric, the procedure described above will eventually exhaust pairs of s ′ k ∈ A k and s k ∈ S k such that s ′ k < s k , so that S < S k ∪ {α} will have to be a normal attack, for some k. But this leads to a contradiction to S being <-admissible and <-defending α.
Hence, by contradiction, S ∪ {α} is <-conflict-free. We now want to show that S ∪ {α} <-defends itself. So let B < S ∪ {α}. As S is <-admissible and <-defends α, we consider this <-attack to be reverse and involving α:
Due to <-conflict-freeness of S ∪ {α}, we find β 1 ∈ B 1 . Then again, by the Axiom of Contraposition, we find
∪ {s 1 }, and β 1 ∈ S 2 . Like with the proof of <-conflict-freeness, this process must terminate with a normal attack S ∪ {α} < B, so that S ∪ {α} eventually <-defends itself.
Finally, given that S <-defends α ′ to begin with, using Lemma 1 we conclude that S ∪ {α} <-defends α ′ too.
For the rest of this section, we assume that (L, R, A,¯¯, ) satisfies the Axiom of Contraposition. We can now define the <-defence operator Def, inspired by (Dung 1995).
Definition 13. Def : ℘(A) → ℘(A) is defined as follows: for A ⊆ A, Def(A) = {α ∈ A : A <-defends α}.
By Lemma 1, Def is monotonic: if
Hence, Def has a unique least fixed point, which is in addition a unique <-grounded extension of (L, R, A,¯¯, ), as shown next.
Proposition 4. (L, R, A,¯¯, ) admits a unique <-grounded extension.
Proof. First, observe that ∅ is <-admissible in (L, R, A,¯¯, ). The least fixed point G can be given as i∈N Def i (∅). By Lemma 3, G is <-admissible. It is clearly <-complete (as G = Def(G)) and unique ⊆-minimal such (as the least fixed point). Hence, G is a unique <-grounded extension of (L, R, A,¯¯, ).
As a consequence of Proposition 4, we get the following.
Using Lemma 3, we can prove the following results.
Proof. By Lemma 3, the collection of <-admissible supersets of ∅ is partially ordered by subset inclusion ⊆, so any sequence ∅ ⊆ A 1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ A n ⊆ . . . of <-admissible sets of assumptions (for n an ordinal) has an upper bound A = i 0 A i . Then A ⊆ A is <-admissible: if it were not <-conflict-free, then some A n would not be either; and for any B < A we have B < A n , for some n, so that A n < B, and hence A < B too. Since every chain ∅ ⊆ A 1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ A n ⊆ . . . admits an <-admissible upper bound, every such chain has a ⊆-maximally <-admissible set of assumptions, according to Zorn's Lemma. As ∅ is <-admissible, (L, R, A,¯¯, ) admits at least one ⊆-maximally <-admissible-i.e. a <-preferred-extension.
Proof. Let E be a <-preferred extension of (L, R, A,¯¯, ) and suppose for a contradiction that it is not <-complete. Let E <-defend some α ∈ A \ E. As E is <-admissible, E ∪ {α} is <-admissible, by Lemma 3. But then E is not ⊆-maximally <-admissible, contrary to E being <-preferred. Hence, by contradiction, E must be <-complete.
Further, as in ABA, <-stable semantics is subsumed by both <-preferred and <-complete semantics, as shown next.
Proposition 8. Any <-stable extension of (L, R, A,¯¯, ) is a <-preferred extension too.
Proof. Let E be a <-stable extension of (L, R, A,¯¯, ). As E <-attacks every {β} E, it must be ⊆-maximally <-admissible. Hence, E is <-preferred.
Proof. Let E be a <-stable extension of (L, R, A,¯¯, ). For any β ∈ E, <-stability of E means that E < {β}, and if E <-defended β as well, it would mean that E < E, contradicting its <-conflict-freeness. Hence, E contains every assumption it <-defends, and so is <-complete.
Finally, we consider <-ideal semantics.
Proposition 10. (L, R, A,¯¯, ) admits a unique <-ideal extension.
Proof. From Proposition 6 we know that (L, R, A,¯¯, ) admits <-preferred extensions, so let S be their intersection. If S = ∅, then it is <-admissible, and so an <-ideal extension (unique). If S = ∅ is <-admissible, then it is an <-ideal extension (unique as well). Else, assume S = ∅ is not <-admissible. Then its ⊆-maximally <-admissible subsets I S are <-ideal extensions of (L, R, A,¯¯, ). Suppose I and I ′ are two distinct <-admissible subsets of S. Then their union I ∪ I ′ is a subset of S too, and so <-conflictfree. By Lemma 3, I ∪ I ′ <-defends its assumptions, so must be <-admissible. Consequently, there can be only one ⊆-maximally <-admissible subset of S, i.e. (L, R, A,¯¯, ) has a unique <-ideal extension.
Proposition 11. Any <-ideal extension of (L, R, A,¯¯, ) is a <-complete extension too.
Proof. By Proposition 10, it has a unique <-ideal extension I. Suppose for a contradiction that I is not <-complete. Then there is α ∈ A \ I <-defended by I. Such α must be contained in the intersection S of <-preferred extensions of (L, R, A,¯¯, ), because I ⊆ S <-defends α and every <-preferred extension E of (L, R, A,¯¯, ) is <-complete (by Proposition 7). But then, I ∪ {α} is <-admissible, according to Lemma 3, so that I is not <-ideal-a contradiction. Therefore, I must be <-complete.
These properties that ABA + exhibits in the presence of Contraposition will be used to show, in the coming sections, that ABA + satisfies certain principles of preference handling and non-monotonic reasoning.
Preference Handling Properties
Referring to (Amgoud and Vesic 2009) , in (Brewka, Truszczyński, and Woltran 2010) the authors hinted at two (arguably) desirable properties of argumentation formalisms dealing with preferences, that concern conflict preservation and the absence of preferences. In the next two subsections we indicate that ABA + satisfies those properties, and in the following subsections show that other (arguably) desirable properties of preference handling are too satisfied by ABA + .
Conflict Preservation
The first property insists that extensions returned after accounting for preferences should be conflict-free with respect to attack relation not taking into account preferences. We formulate it as a principle applicable to ABA + as follows.
Definition 14. (L, R, A,¯¯, ) fulfils the Principle of Conflict Preservation for <-σ semantics if for all <-σ extensions E ⊆ A of (L, R, A,¯¯, ), for any α, β ∈ A, {α} {β} implies that either α ∈ E or β ∈ E.
In (Čyras and Toni 2016a) it was shown that Lemma 2 guarantees the following result.
Consequently, ABA + ensures conflict preservation:
Proposition 13. (L, R, A,¯¯, ) fulfils the Principle of Conflict Preservation for any semantics <-σ.
Proof. Let E be a <-σ extension of (L, R, A,¯¯, ), If α, β ∈ E and {α} {β}, then {α, β} is not conflict-free, and hence not <-conflict-free, by Proposition 12. But then E is not <-conflict-free either, which is a contradiction. Thus, either one of α and β does not belong to E.
Empty Preferences
The second property insists that if there are no preferences, then the extensions returned using a preference handling mechanism should be the same as those obtained without accounting for preferences. We formulate it as a principle applicable to ABA + as follows.
Definition 15. Suppose that the preference relation in (L, R, A,¯¯, ) is the strict empty ordering ∅. Then (L, R, A,¯¯, ∅) fulfils the Principle of Empty Preferences for ∅-σ semantics if for all ∅-σ extensions E ⊆ A of (L, R, A,¯¯, ∅), E is a σ extension of (L, R, A,¯¯).
In (Čyras and Toni 2016a) the following result was shown to hold.
This theorem, in addition to saying that ABA + is a conservative extension of ABA, immediately yields the satisfaction of the principle in question: Proposition 15. (L, R, A,¯¯, ∅) fulfils the Principle of Empty Preferences for any semantics ∅-σ. (Amgoud and Vesic 2014) proposed a property concerning inclusion in extensions of the 'strongest' arguments, i.e. arguments that are maximal w.r.t. preference ordering. We next reformulate the property to be applicable to ABA + .
Maximal Elements
Definition 16. Suppose the preference ordering of (L, R, A,¯¯, ) is total and further assume that the set M = {α ∈ A : ∄β ∈ A with α < β} is <-conflict-free. (L, R, A,¯¯, ) fulfils the Principle of Maximal Elements for <-σ semantics if for all <-σ extensions E ⊆ A of (L, R, A,¯¯, ), it holds that M ⊆ E.
As an illustration, in Example 8, α is a uniquemaximal element in A, and {α} is a unique <-σ extension of (L, R, A,¯¯, ), whence (L, R, A,¯¯, ) fulfils the Principle of Maximal Elements for any semantics <-σ.
Our next result shows that in general, ABA + satisfies this principle under <-stable and <-complete semantics.
Proposition 16. (L, R, A,¯¯, ) fulfils the Principle of Maximal Elements for <-stable and <-complete semantics.
Proof. Let the preference ordering of (L, R, A,¯¯, ) be total and suppose M = {α ∈ A : ∄β ∈ A with α < β} is <-conflict-free. We first show that M is not <-attacked.
Fix α ∈ M and suppose for a contradiction that for some S ⊆ A it holds that S < {α}. So either (i) ∃B ⊢ R α with B ⊆ S and ∀β ∈ B α β or β α, or (ii) {α} ⊢ R β for some β ∈ S with α < β. Note that the case (ii) cannot happen, because α is -maximal. So consider case (i). Since is total, it follows that α β ∀β ∈ B. But as α ismaximal, it must also hold that β α, for any β ∈ B. From here, we show B ⊆ M . Indeed, fix β ∈ B and assume for a contradiction that β ∈ M . Then ∃γ ∈ A such that β < γ. By transitivity, α < γ, contradicting α's -maximality. So we must have β ∈ M , and consequently, B ⊆ M .
But now, since α ∈ M, B ⊆ M and B < {α}, this contradicts <-conflict-freeness of M . Therefore, by contradiction, S < {α}, for any S ⊆ A. Since α ∈ M was arbitrary, we have M <-unattacked, as required.
If (L, R, A,¯¯, ) admits no <-stable or <-complete extensions, then the principle is fulfilled trivially. Otherwise, let E ⊆ A be <-stable in (L, R, A,¯¯, ). Pick α ∈ M and suppose for a contradiction that α ∈ E. Then E < {α}, which is a contradiction. Thus, α ∈ S, and hence M ⊆ S.
Now let E be a <-complete extension of (L, R, A,¯¯, ) and suppose for a contradiction M E. Then E does not <-defend some α ∈ M . This means that S < M for some S ⊆ A, which is a contradiction. Hence, M ⊆ E. This principle may, however, be violated under, say, <-preferred semantics: in Example 12, the framework (L, R, A,¯¯, ) to begin with, admits {α, β} as a <-preferred extension, while γ ∈ {α, β} is a -maximal element. However, assuming Contraposition, the Principle of Maximal Elements is satisfied under the remaining semantics too.
Corollary 17. If (L, R, A,¯¯, ) satisfies the Axiom of Contraposition, then it fulfils the Principle of Maximal Elements for <-preferred/<-ideal/<-grounded semantics.
Proof. Follows from Propositions 4, 7, 11 and 16.
Principle I
(Brewka and Eiter 2000) formulated a principle for sound extension-based default reasoning with preferences, which we reformulate for ABA + next.
Definition 17. (L, R, A,¯¯, ) fulfils Principle I for <-σ semantics if for all E, E ′ ⊆ A such that E = E 0 ∪ {α} and E ′ = E 0 ∪ {α ′ } for some E 0 ⊆ A, with α, α ′ ∈ E 0 and α ′ < α, it holds that if E is a <-σ extension of (L, R, A,¯¯, ), then E ′ is not a <-σ extension of (L, R, A,¯¯, ).
This principle insists that if two coherent viewpoints of a situation differ only in that each of them contains a single assumption not contained in the other, then the viewpoint with the more preferred assumption should be chosen. ABA + satisfies this principle under <-stable semantics.
Proposition 18. (L, R, A,¯¯, ) fulfils Principle I for <-stable semantics.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that both E = E 0 ∪ {α} and E ′ = E 0 ∪ {α ′ }, where α ′ < α, are <-stable extensions of (L, R, A,¯¯, ). As E ′ is <-stable and α ∈ E ′ , we get E ′ < {α}. As E is <-conflict-free, we find E 0 < {α}, so (from E ′ < {α} we get that): (i) either there is E ′′ ∪ {α ′ } ⊢ R α with E ′′ ⊆ E 0 and ε < α ∀ε ∈ E ′′ ∪ {α ′ }; (ii) or {α} ⊢ R α ′ is such that α < α ′ . As α ′ < α, both cases lead to a contradiction, so that E ′ is not a <-stable extension, provided E is.
In Example 8, E = {α} is a unique <-stable extension of (L, R, A,¯¯, ), which illustrates the principle as follows: take E 0 = ∅ so that E = {α} and E ′ = {β}, where β < α. It is important that Principle I is satisfied under <-stable semantics, because (Brewka and Eiter 1999) investigated (preferred) answer sets of logic programs, and answer sets in Logic Programming correspond to stable extensions in ABA (Bondarenko et al. 1997) . Satisfaction of the principle gives hope that preferred answer set semantics can be captured in ABA + , as answer set semantics is captured in ABA. Principle I, however, may be violated under <-preferred semantics: in Example 12, (L, R, A,¯¯, ) has two <-preferred extensions {α, β} and {β, γ}, and yet α < γ. Note, though, that (L, R ′ , A,¯¯, ) satisfies the Axiom of Contraposition and has a unique <-σ extension {β, γ}, and thus fulfils Principle I for any semantics <-σ. Based on our investigations, we conjecture that assuming Contraposition, ABA + frameworks fulfil the principle for the remaining semantics as well. Verifying this is left as future work.
6 Non-Monotonic Reasoning Properties (Čyras and Toni 2015) proposed and studied the well known non-monotonic inference properties of Cautious Monotonicity (MON henceforth) and Cumulative Transitivity (CUT henceforth) for ABA. Here, we investigate some of those properties for ABA + . We first recall (some of) the properties considered and results obtained. Assume as given a fixed, but otherwise arbitrary (flat) ABA framework F = (L, R, A,¯¯). Let E be a σ extension of F . In what follows, E ′ will denote a σ extension of a newly constructed ABA framework F ′ . To avoid trivialities, we consider cases only where each of F and F ′ has at least one σ extension-E and E ′ respectively.
We first recall the STRICT setting regarding strengthening of information. Given ψ ∈ Cn(E) \ A, define F ′ = (L, R ∪ {ψ ← ⊤}, A,¯¯). There are four properties:
CREDULOUS STRICT MON :
There is an extension E ′ of F ′ with Cn(E) ⊆ Cn(E ′ ). Table 1 summarizes results pertaining to ABA (sceptical and credulous versions coincide under grounded and ideal semantics, and for other semantics the status of the credulous property is indicated in parentheses).
Property
Grd. Ideal Stable Pref. Cpl. 
The properties are as follows:
CREDULOUS ASM MON :
There is an extension E ′ of F ′ with Cn(E) ⊆ Cn(E ′ ). Table 2 summarizes results regarding ABA in the ASM setting (notation as before). The non-monotonic inference properties CUT and MON can be readily applied to ABA + . Take F to be an 2 For brevity reasons, the same symbol¯¯is used for both contrary mappings, and in the new framework F ′ , the contrary mapping¯¯is implicitly restricted to a diminished set of assumptions.
ABA
+ framework (L, R, A,¯¯, ), let E be its <-σ extension, and given ψ ∈ Cn(E), define F ′ as follows:
′ is a restriction of to A \ {ψ}. We can then analyse whether the non-monotonic inference properties in question are satisfied in ABA + . Trivially, as ABA + is a conservative extension of ABA (cf. Theorem 14), properties violated in ABA will remain violated in ABA + . Therefore, we will focus on those that are satisfied in ABA; in particular, the credulous versions except for MON under ideal semantics. Example 18. As an illustration of the properties, recall Example 12. The ABA + framework F = (L, R ′ , A,¯¯, ) (that satisfies the Axiom of Contraposition) has a unique <-σ extension {β, γ} with Cn({β, γ}) = {α, β, γ}.
• STRICT setting: take α and let F ′ = (L, R ∪ {α ← ⊤}, A,¯¯, ). Then F ′ has a unique <-σ extension {β, γ}.
• ASM setting: take β and let F ′ = (L, R ∪ {β ← ⊤}, A \ {β},¯¯, ′ ) with α < ′ γ. Then F ′ likewise has a unique <-σ extension {β, γ}. As conclusions of extensions of both F and F ′ are actually the same, the credulous versions of the properties are indeed satisfied in both settings.
In what follows, we assume that a given ABA + framework F = (L, R, A,¯¯, ) satisfies the Axiom of Weak Contraposition (Čyras and Toni 2016b) ), which is a weaker form of the Axiom of Contraposition.
We first show that ABA + inherits the behaviour from ABA with respect to the non-monotonic inference properties under <-stable semantics. Proposition 19. F fulfils CREDULOUS STRICT CUT and CREDULOUS STRICT MON for <-stable semantics.
Proof. Let F = (L, R, A,¯¯, ) be a flat ABA + framework satisfying the Axiom of Weak Contraposition, let E be a <-stable extension of F , and let ψ ∈ Cn(E) \ A. Define F ′ = (L, R ∪ {ψ ← ⊤}, A,¯¯, ). Cn and Cn ′ will denote the conclusion operators of, respectively, F and F ′ . The <-attack relations of F and F ′ will be denoted by < and ′ < , respectively. We claim that E is a <-stable extension of F ′ . Suppose for a contradiction that E is not <-conflictfree in F ′ . Then E is not conflict-free in (L, R ∪ {ψ ← ⊤}, A,¯¯), by (Čyras and Toni 2016b, Theorem 5) . But then, as ψ ∈ Cn(E), E is not conflict-free in (L, R, A,¯¯) either. Hence, by (Čyras and Toni 2016b, Theorem 5), E is not <-conflict-free in F , which is a contradiction. Thus, E is <-conflict-free in F ′ . Now let β ∈ A \ E be arbitrary. We aim to show that E ′ < {β}. To this end, as E is <-stable in F , we know that E < {β}. We split into cases.
• Suppose E < {β} via normal attack. Then A ⊢ R β, A ⊆ E, R ⊆ R and ∀α ∈ A α < β. If this deduction does not involve ψ, then clearly we have A ′ < {β} via normal attack. Else, we can find A ′ ⊆ A and
< {β} via normal attack too.
• Suppose E < {β} via reverse attack. Then {β} ⊢ ε for some ε ∈ E such that β < ε. Since β ∈ E and E is <-conflict-free, this <-attack does not involve ψ. Hence, {ε} ′ < {β} via reverse attack too. In any event, E ′ < {β}, as required. Therefore, E is <-stable in F ′ .
Proposition 20. F fulfils CREDULOUS ASM CUT and CREDULOUS ASM MON for <-stable semantics.
Proof. Let F = (L, R, A,¯¯, ) be a flat ABA + framework satisfying the Axiom of Weak Contraposition, let E be a <-stable extension of F , and let ψ ∈ Cn(E) ∩ A. Define F ′ = (L, R ∪ {ψ ← ⊤}, A \ {ψ},¯¯, ′ ), where ′ is a restriction of to A \ {ψ}. Cn and Cn ′ will denote the conclusion operators of, respectively, F and F ′ . The <-attack relations of F and F ′ will be denoted by < and ′ < , respectively. We show that E \ {ψ} is <-stable in F ′ . Suppose for a contradiction that E \{ψ} is not <-conflictfree in F ′ . Then E \{ψ} is not conflict-free in (L, R∪{ψ ← ⊤}, A\{ψ},¯¯), by (Čyras and Toni 2016b, Theorem 5) . But then, as ψ ∈ Cn(E), E is not conflict-free in (L, R, A,¯¯). Hence, by (Čyras and Toni 2016b, Theorem 5) , E is not <-conflict-free in F , which is a contradiction. Thus, E \ {ψ} must be <-conflict-free in F ′ . Now let β ∈ A \ (E ∪ {ψ}) be arbitrary. We aim to show that E \ {ψ} ′ < {β}. To this end, as E is <-stable in F , we know that E < {β}.
• Suppose E < {β} via normal attack. Then A ⊢ R β, A ⊆ E, R ⊆ R and ∀α ∈ A α < β. If ψ ∈ A, then we have A ′ < {β} via normal attack. Else, we find A\{ψ} ⊢ R β, so that A\{ψ} ′ < {β} via normal attack.
• Suppose E < {β} via reverse attack. Then {β} ⊢ ε for some ε ∈ E such that β < ε. If ε = ψ, then this <-attack does not involve ψ, and so we have {ε} ′ < {β} via reverse attack, where {ε} ⊆ E \ {ψ}. Else, {β} ⊢ ψ and β < ψ, so the Axiom of Weak Contraposition guarantees that, in F , we have A ⊢ β for some A ⊆ {ψ}. But then, in F ′ , we find ∅ ⊢ β. In any event, E \ {ψ}
In general, ABA + does not inherit all the properties from ABA. In particular, CUT and MON can in general be violated in both STRICT and ASM settings under all but <-stable semantics. The following examples illustrate violations.
This flat ABA + framework F satisfies the Axiom of Weak Contraposition. It has a unique <-grounded/<-ideal/<-preferred/<-complete (but not <-stable) extension E = {p, q, α, ε} with Cn(E) = {p, q, α, ψ, ε}. Note that {α} <-defends {ε} from {β, x, p, q} by <-attacking the latter via reverse attack, due to the rule α ← β, x, p and the preference β < α.
Consider F ′ = (L, R∪{ψ ← ⊤}, A,¯¯, ). In this framework, {ε} is <-attacked by the self-<-attacking {β, x}, and no subset of E can <-defend {ε} against this <-attack. Indeed, F ′ has a unique <-grounded/<-ideal/<-preferred/<-complete (but not <-stable) extension E ′ = {p, q, α} with Cn ′ (E ′ ) = {p, q, α, ψ} Cn(E). (Here and in further examples, Cn ′ is the conclusion operator of F ′ .) Hence, F does not fulfil STRICT MON under any of the four semantics in question.
Example 20 (ASM MON violation). Consider F and E from Example 19. Let F ′ = (L, R ∪ {α ← ⊤}, A \ {α},¯¯, ∅). In F ′ , {ε} is <-attacked by the self-<-attacking {β, x, p, q}, and cannot be <-defended by any set not containing x. Overall, F ′ has a unique <-grounded/<-ideal/<-preferred/<-complete (but not <-stable) extension E ′ = {p, q} with Cn ′ (E ′ ) = {p, q, α, ψ} Cn(E). Hence, F does not fulfil ASM MON under any of the four semantics in question.
So F is simply F ′ from Example 19. It satisfies the Axiom of Weak Contraposition and we know that it has a unique <-grounded/<-ideal/<-preferred/<-complete (but not <-stable) extension E = {p, q, α} with Cn(E) = {p, q, α, ψ}. Let F ′ = (L, R ∪ {p ← ⊤}, A \ {p},¯¯, ). In F ′ , given that p is a fact, the <-attacker {β, x} of {ε} is <-attacked by {α} via reverse attack. Thus, {α} <-defends {ε}, and so E ′ = {q, α, ε} with Cn ′ (E ′ ) = {p, q, α, ψ, ε} Cn(E) is a unique <-grounded/<-ideal/<-preferred/<-complete (but not <-stable) extension of F ′ . This shows that F does not fulfil ASM CUT under any of the four semantics in question.
(So, in contrast to the framework from Example 19, there is an intermediate non-assumption y deducible from {p} and replacing p in the rule α ← β, x, p; we also have ψ as a fact, and the rule β ← α, x will be needed for Weak Contraposition in the framework F ′ after the change.) F satisfies the Axiom of Weak Contraposition and has a unique <-grounded/<-ideal/<-preferred/<-complete (but not <-stable) extension E = {p, q, α} with Cn(E) = {p, q, α, ψ, y}. Let F ′ = (L, R ∪ {y ← ⊤}, A,¯¯, ). (Since in F ′ we have the deduction {β, x} ⊢ {α←β,x} α with β < α, the rule β ← α, x guarantees that F ′ satisfies the Axiom of Weak Contraposition.) Similarly to Example 21, {α} <-defends {ε}, and F ′ has a unique <-grounded/<-ideal/<-preferred/<-complete (but not <-stable) extension q, α, ψ, y, ε} Cn(E) . Hence, F does not fulfil STRICT CUT under any of the four semantics in question. Table 3 summarizes this section's results (sceptical and credulous versions coincide under <-grounded and <-ideal semantics; for other semantics the credulous version is indicated in parentheses.) Property <-g. <-id. <-stb. <-pr. <-cpl. + to obtain the same results is a line of future research. So far we know only that a particular relaxation, namely the Axiom of Weak Contraposition (Čyras and Toni 2016b) , changes the behaviour of ABA + with respect to non-monotonic reasoning properties, as discussed in Section 6.
The preference handling principle discussed in Section 5.4 was originally proposed, along with some other properties, by (Brewka and Eiter 1999) for answer set programming (ASP) with preferences. To the best of our knowledge, reformulation of Principle I for ABA + is the first application of this principle to argumentation with preferences. Building on (Brewka and Eiter 1999) , (Šimko 2014) discussed an extended set of principles for ASP with preferences, most of which focus on preferences over rules. Whether those principles can be applied to ABA + is a future work direction. Regarding preference handling in argumentation, along with the Principle of Maximal Elements discussed in Section 5.3, (Amgoud and Vesic 2014) suggested several arguably desirable properties of argumentation with preferences. Those properties are exhibited in ABA + as Proposition 12 and Theorem 14. Referring to those properties, (Brewka, Truszczyński, and Woltran 2010 ) also hinted at other properties regarding selection among extensions, as possible principles of preference handling in argumentation. Relating those principles to ABA + is left for future work.
In terms on non-monotonic reasoning properties, Cautious Monotonicity and Cumulative Transitivity (studied in Section 6) are traced to (Makinson 1988; Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor 1990) and fall into the well studied area of analysing non-monotonic reasoning with respect to information change (cf. (Rott 2001) ). In argumentation setting, the latter is also known as argumentation dynamics, and has recently been a topic of interest in the argumentation community (see e.g. (Cayrol, de Saint-Cyr, and Lagasquie-Schiex 2010; Falappa et al. 2011; Coste-Marquis et al. 2014; Booth et al. 2014; Diller et al. 2015; Baumann and Brewka 2015) ). In particular, non-monotonic inference properties were investigated in (Hunter 2010) with respect to argumentclaim entailment in logic-based argumentation systems; in (Čyras and Toni 2015) for ABA; and with regards to ASPIC + -type-of argumentation systems in (Dung 2016). Only the latter of the three works concerns argumentation with preferences. In addition to considering different structured argumentation setting and different preference handling mechanisms, it diverges from our analysis in Section 6 in that (Dung 2016) regards Cumulative Transitivity plus Cautious Monotonicity as a single property of Cumulativity and studies it only for stable and complete semantics. Other argumentation-related properties from (Dung 2016) will be studied for ABA + in the future.
Several other topics of interest are left for future work. For instance, integrating dynamic preferences (see e.g. (Zhang and Foo 1997; Prakken and Sartor 1999; Brewka and Woltran 2010) ) within ABA + and studying their interaction with the properties of preference handling as well as of non-monotonic inference. Also, relation of ABA + to Logic Programming with preferences (e.g. (Sakama and Inoue 1996; Zhang and Foo 1997; Brewka and Eiter 1999) ) and non-monotonic reasoning formalisms equipped with preferences in general (e.g. (Brewka 1989; Baader and Hollunder 1995; Rintanen 1998; Brewka and Eiter 2000; Delgrande and Schaub 2000; Stolzenburg et al. 2003; Kakas and Moraitis 2003) ) is left for future research.
There are as well numerous approaches to integrating reasoning with preferences within argumentation, e.g. (Amgoud and Cayrol 2002; Bench-Capon 2003; Kaci and van der Torre 2008; Modgil 2009; Modgil and Prakken 2010; Baroni et al. 2011; Dunne et al. 2011; Brewka et al. 2013; Amgoud and Vesic 2014; Wakaki 2014; Modgil and Prakken 2013; Dung 2016) . It would be interesting to study these formalisms with respect to the properties considered in this paper, where it has not already been done. We leave this as future work.
We investigated various properties of a recently proposed non-monotonic reasoning formalism ABA + (Čyras and Toni 2016a ) that deals with preferences in structured argumentation. In particular, we first established that assuming the principle of Contraposition (see e.g. (Modgil and Prakken 2013)), ABA + semantics exhibit desirable properties akin to those of other existing argumentation formalisms, such as (Dung 1995). We then showed that ABA + satisfies some (arguably) desirable principles of preference handling in argumentation and non-monotonic reasoning, e.g. (Brewka and Eiter 1999) . Finally, we analysed non-monotonic inference properties (as in (Čyras and Toni 2015) ) of ABA + under various semantics. We believe our work contributes to the understanding of preferences within argumentation in particular, and in non-monotonic reasoning at large.
